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18 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services  
Committee - 4 August 1964 - 9:00 a.m.

1. The Director met with the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services on 4 August 1964 at 9:00 a.m. Mr. Vinson was in the chair. Also present for the Subcommittee were:

L. Mendel Rivers  
F. Edward Hebert  
Melvin Price  
Charles E. Bennett  
George Huddleston, Jr.  
Leslie C. Arends  
William G. Bray  
Frank C. Osmer  
John R. Blandford, Counsel

Also present for the Agency were:

Ray Cline  
Arthur C. Lundahl  
John S. Warner


There was a security check of the room before the hearing and no transcript was taken.

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OX CART

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
2. The Director discussed the OXCART program pointing out



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CHINESE COMMUNISTS OVERFLIGHTS

3. The Director then discussed the overflight program over Communist China using U-2s. He stated that for two to three years we



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25X1 [REDACTED] He further indicated that they are not generally vulnerable to MIG-21s although possibly, with a lucky shot on a zoom, they might be vulnerable. There was a query from Mr. Bray about MIG-21s in Communist China and the Director indicated that we had recently identified about nine which possibly had been brought from North Korea. The question was raised as to whether or not the usefulness of the U-2 was at an end and whether or not satellites could fill the bill. The Director stated that we achieved better resolution through the U-2s and they are relatively easier to handle in terms of targeting.

#### SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

4. The Director pointed out that looking at all of the activities in the area of Soviet military developmental work, the picture that emerges is one of a broad, balanced dynamic program moving forward steadily in several fields at the same time. He listed these fields:

- New ICBMs are being tested.
- New systems are under construction at the Tyuratam test center.
- A new ICBM deployment concept is beginning.
- New facilities are being constructed at nuclear materials production plants.
- New electronics installations--possibly related to an anti-satellite mission-- are being built.
- New defensive missile installations are under construction.

The Director then stated that it is evident that the Soviets are continuing to invest heavily in the qualitative improvement of both their long-range strike capability against the U.S. and in their strategic defenses. The Director pointed out that there was a contradiction between the Soviet actions and military posture, and their soft-talking and apparent peaceful actions in the UN and otherwise. The Director stated we should not be lulled by the apparent attitude of the Soviets when we look at their actions.

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5. The Director read from his briefing papers as follows:

"Over the past several months we have been getting increasing evidence that a new generation of Soviet ICBMs is being developed.

A. You will recall that the last time I briefed you we had determined that the Soviets were testing two new missiles, which we now call the SS-9 and the SS-10.

B. Three Soviet missile range instrumentation ships are now in the Pacific to monitor long range firings of ICBMs. They are generally in position south of Johnston Island, and Moscow has issued a warning to avoid two impact areas there from today until the end of the year.

1. One of the impact areas is farther from Tyuratam than any previously used--7,000 nautical miles.

2. We expect the Soviets to test the SS-9, and possibly the more untried SS-10 over these extended ranges. They might also try extended range firings of their established ICBMs from operational sites.

C. We have recently identified six single, dispersed silos under construction at Tyuratam. One of these silos is shown on the board you see now. It is obvious that the Soviets are vigorously pushing this mode of deployment.

D. At present, the 18 established ICBM complexes have their launchers deployed in clusters of two or three, which make it possible for several to be destroyed by a single nuclear blast. The Soviets may be curtailing this mode of deployment. (See Map of Soviet ICBM complexes.)

1. We recently have had to reduce our count of the number of Soviet ICBM launchers. We formerly listed 238 operational or under construction, but currently are down to 230.

2. Several SS-7 and SS-8 sites begun last year appear to have been abandoned; at the least, construction has been halted for some time.

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3. Of the above, we estimate that 190 are operational.


E. We now have discovered what we believe to be a new ICBM complex under construction in an area 80 miles south of Semipalatinsk--the first new complex in about two years. (Show board of Zhangiz Tobe)

1. In the new complex the silos under construction are dispersed in a single silo pattern, similar to those under development at Tyuratam. The SS-9 or another new missile probably will be deployed at this site.

2. The silo is bigger in diameter than others we have seen, which could mean that it is designed to launch the missile without first raising it to the surface.

3. If this pattern is extended to other parts of the Soviet Union, it will, of course, greatly increase the number of aiming points for the U. S. strike force.

III. The USSR also is expanding production of materials needed to manufacture nuclear weapons.



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The Director added that in two or three years the Soviet's capability of production of materials needed to manufacture nuclear weapons will be substantially increased. The Director stated that it was not a matter about which we should be excited but we should be alert.

6. The Director stated we are becoming concerned with the possibility that the Soviets are moving to develop an anti-satellite capability. They are aware of our satellite reconnaissance program, and from their own experience with satellite reconnaissance vehicles they probably have gleaned some idea of how successful we have been. We would expect them to be developing ways of denying us this type of information. Recently we have seen the beginnings of construction of large, expensive electronics installations, both deep in the USSR and on its periphery. These installations appear to be phased array radars and may have satellite tracking functions. One of them, located at Olenegorsk, may also be a ballistic missile early warning radar. The fact that one of the installations is located at the Sary Shagan anti-missile test center suggests that the Soviets may intend to use them as ABM acquisitions radars as well.

7. The Director added that as in the period just before Powers was shot down, the Soviets were quiet until they developed the capability of shooting down the U-2, and now they are being quiet and may be developing a capability to intercept our satellite reconnaissance vehicle. If the Soviets were successful in achieving this capability, this would create a serious problem for intelligence. The Director indicated that there is one group which believes nuclear weapons would be needed to knock out a satellite, but others believe that the Soviet guidance systems may be good enough to enable them to achieve a knockdown with high explosives or pellets.


8. The Director pointed out that there were two potential escapes for the Soviets in connection with the nuclear test ban treaty. They might well regard either the explosion of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists, or the French explosions of a thermonuclear weapon, as an excuse to renounce the treaty and resume testing.

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10. The Director then returned to his briefing paper reading as follows:

"V. As for Soviet defense, two defensive missile installations are under construction in the general Leningrad-Moscow area. They appear to be designed for long range, surface-to-air intercept of aircraft and standoff weapons like our HOUND DOG air-to-surface missile.

A. We have evidence suggesting that one of the three sites making up the probable ABM complex at Leningrad will have one of these new SAM complexes.

1. However, we believe that, temporarily at least, the Soviets are abandoning their efforts to install an ABM system around Leningrad. Even if ABM construction were to resume now, it is unlikely that a system could become operational before 1966.

B. Work on the suspect ABM system around Moscow continues. The large inverted V-shaped radar being built south of the city could be part of the Moscow system."

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"VI. The Soviet Navy lately seems to be more willing to see the sea than it has in the past. There have been a number of long-range nuclear submarine patrols by Pacific and Northern Fleet units.

A. In addition, ships and submarines from all three Western fleets--Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea--have been conducting exercises in the Mediterranean since mid-June.

B. The Soviets now have an initial operational capability for a submerged launch ballistic missile, with at least two such submarines in commission. In contrast to our POLARIS system, each submarine apparently has only three tubes, and the range of the missile is much shorter--about 700 nautical miles.

C. The Soviet submarine fleet appears to be putting its present emphasis on both nuclear and conventional submarines armed with cruise missiles.

1. There are now about 30 of these boats in commission, capable of launching missiles from the surface to a range of about 450 miles. They could be used to engage either surface fleets or shore targets.

2. The cruise-missile boats are getting bigger and bigger. A class with six launchers has been succeeded by types with eight launchers. Just recently, we photographed a submarine at Severomorsk which appears to be big enough and long enough to be a nuclear submarine with 10 cruise-missile tubes.

D. All construction appears to have stopped on submarines which fire ballistic missiles from the surface.

E. The Soviets now have over 30 nuclear submarines with various types in service. They have overcome some of the bugs that plagued the nuclear subs at the outset, but it still appears that a surface tender accompanies each nuclear boat on out-of-area cruises."

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11. In connection with Soviet ground forces, the Director stated that there is growing evidence that the Soviet forces in East Germany are being reorganized and that some withdrawals may be taking place. The number of divisions may be reduced from 23 to 21. He stated that we could expect Khrushchev to seek diplomatic and propaganda mileage from these actions.

12. The Director returned to the briefing paper as follows:

"VIII. I mentioned in June that the outer space probe the Soviets launched on April 2--which they called ZOND I--probably was intended as a Venus mission and should arrive there about July 20.

A. The Soviets never did call it a Venus mission, although they claimed to have made two mid-course corrections putting the probe on a proper course.

B. The target date has passed in silence--and apparently the probe did too. As far as we can tell, communications failed again, denying the Soviets any information on Venus which they could have used as a propaganda triumph."

#### CUBA

13. The Director then briefed on Cuba from the briefing paper as follows:

"In Cuba, the last major withdrawal of Soviet military personnel appears to have been completed. Since the 1962 missile crisis, some 20,000 Soviet servicemen have been pulled out in four major withdrawal periods, with about 5,000 personnel leaving the island during each period. The most recent period extended from the beginning of May through the end of July, during which time more than 5,000 Russians sailed from Cuba on 14 Soviet passenger ships."

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14. It now appears that there are only about 2,000 Soviet military technicians and advisors left in what has become essentially a Soviet military aid and advisory group on the island. All Soviet communications facilities in Cuba have been de-activated or turned over to the Cubans except for one naval link which will probably terminate operations soon. No Soviet operational or combat units are known to remain on the island.

15. Thus, the Cubans most certainly have full control over the operation of all Soviet weapons left behind, including the surface-to-air missiles. The Soviets have removed all their sensitive radar and communications gear, and as far as we can tell, they now give only advice to the Cuban armed forces, backed up by their political and economic leverage. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets have retained some sort of physical restraint over the actual firing of the SA-2 missiles in Cuba.

16. The Director added that we have no evidence that the Soviets have retained physical control over the firing of SA-2 missiles but on the basis of judgment believe that they probably have in order to avoid the confrontation resulting from a shoot down of a U-2.

17. The Director returned to the briefing paper as follows:

"Both the Soviets and Cubans have indicated, however, that they do not intend to get into a wrangle over the U-2 issue until after the U. S. elections, at which time Castro has said he will take the issue to the UN General Assembly. Castro also took the occasion of his 26 July speech to play down the U-2 issue somewhat. He said that "for the sake of peace" he would be patient with the U-2 planes for the time being. There is always the possibility of an unauthorized shoot down or an impulsive decision by Castro in reaction to an exile raid or minor clash with the U. S. In any case, Castro probably has little confidence that the Soviets would provide any real assistance if the U. S. forcibly reacted to a U-2 shoot down. "

18. Castro's defiant reaction to the OAS sanctions against his regime indicates no let up of Cuban subversion in Latin America. It belies a report we had from Venezuela early in July that Cuba, possibly

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at Soviet urging, was restricting its support for revolutionaries. Castro in his 26 July speech asserted Cuba's right to support revolutionaries in any country which opposes his regime. He specifically sent his encouragement to the "courageous" rebels and guerrillas of Venezuela and Guatemala. The speech suggested that only those countries which shun the effort to isolate Cuba can count on immunity from Cuban subversion. He praised Mexico in particular for voting against the OAS sanctions, and offered to conclude a mutual non-intervention treaty. He added that Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia--which also opposed the sanctions--could join in.

19. The Director stated that the Cuban subversive effort in Latin America generally is not as extensive as it had been and is not too serious at this time. He pointed out that Latin American countries generally have taken a firmer stand than in the past. Mr. Arends inquired whether this was a desire to work with the U. S. or was it a realization of the dangers. The Director stated he did not believe it was solely their desire to please the Americans, but that they have come to realize that the governments of all their own countries may be at stake. Mr. Osmer's inquired whether there was any evidence of a split within the regime. The Director said that we could not identify any such possible split but that it may develop as economic conditions deteriorate. It was pointed out that we have been working in the hope of developing such a split but there is no such evidence at this time.

20. The Director indicated that we continue to receive reports on missiles in Cuba and that every effort is being made to verify this. However, we have not been able to obtain any evidence on this subject and the Director commented it is difficult to prove the negative. Mr. Arends inquired whether we were getting better information. The Director indicated that he thought we were getting better information but some of our nets have been rolled up and we have established new ones. He indicated that information [redacted] i25X1 Cuba is quite good. Mr. Vinson inquired whether the newspaper reports concerning the execution of CIA agents are accurate. The Director indicated in many cases the individuals involved were not connected with the Agency [redacted] The Director again touched on the question of whether Castro is secure, indicating that generally he has things under tight control with the military and the security forces, and despite the economic decline and the consequent hardship, Cuba is a fertile land and there probably will not be starvation.

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## CHILE

21. The Director touched briefly on the forthcoming Chilean election of 4 September. It was pointed out that there is a well organized Communist effort to support Allende. The Communists are being supplied with considerable money and are making strenuous efforts. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] At this point the polls would indicate that Frei is in a comfortable position but the Director stated he could not make any prediction on the outcome.

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## SOUTH VIETNAM

22. Mr. Cline briefed on the Southeast Asia situation, stating that the pace of the fighting has been greatly intensified in South Vietnam. In July the Viet Cong made 12 major attacks using at least one battalion. It was pointed out their battalions run about 400 men. He stated there were more major attacks in July alone than there were in the first five months of 1964 or in the first nine months of 1963. Mr. Cline pointed out that these attacks were in addition to the continued high rate of terrorism, sabotage, and harrassment. On the question of ammunition and supplies, Mr. Cline indicated there was some surprise at the continued intensity of the Viet Cong effort, since normally there would have to be a lull for replenishing supplies. In terms of casualties it was stated that these efforts are costly to the South Vietnamese forces. Though the South Vietnamese have sustained more casualties, the Viet Cong have suffered more fatalities. Mr. Cline gave figures on casualties covering the three weeks of July from the date General Taylor arrived. He indicated there were a total of 2304 incidents. South Vietnamese forces killed were a total of 689 and Viet Cong 1310. On an over-all basis, including killed, captured, wounded or missing, the total casualties were: South Vietnam, 2650, and Viet Cong, 1500. It was pointed out that there is evidence that individual North Vietnamese soldiers are present with the Viet Cong forces. This suggests that Hanoi may have used up

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the pool of able-bodied southerners who withdrew to the north with the Viet Minh at the time of partition. Mr. Cline pointed out that MACV after an intensified effort has recently increased its estimate of Viet Cong hard-core regular strength from 25,000 to a range of 28,000 to 34,000. It was stated that this did not represent a sudden reinforcement.

23. Mr. McCone commented on the covert operations in North Vietnam which had been previously conducted by CIA but which were turned over to MACV. He indicated that there had been many disappointments with these operations with a number of teams rolled up and that the sabotage efforts have not been too significant. The Director pointed out that he was not offering this in criticism but only that it is disturbing. It would indicate that the people in North Vietnam are not receptive or in the mood to assist South Vietnamese teams infiltrated into the area. Mr. Cline indicated that we have no firm evidence of negotiations by any of the major leaders in South Vietnam with the North Vietnamese although there is some evidence of minor officials conducting talks. Mr. Cline indicated that the political honeymoon General Khanh may have enjoyed is long since ended. There is rough weather ahead with bickering among the leaders and increasing rumors of coup plotting although there is not firm enough evidence to cause alarm at this time, still they cannot be dismissed.

24. Mr. Cline agreed with Arends' statement that this means that we should not be surprised if we read about a coup in the newspapers tomorrow. Mr. Cline touched on the difficulties between Khanh and General "Big" Minh. It was indicated, however, that Khanh still seems to be in control.

#### LAOS

25. Mr. McCone touched on some of the considerations involved in the Laos situation. It was indicated there was some effort to establish preconditions to any negotiations based on the Geneva accords. These would include Communist withdrawal and a cease fire. Also, the parties in Laos should meet with the members of the ICC to go into these matters prior to any conference of the Geneva participants. The Director indicated the Soviets would certainly like to retain influence in Southeast Asia and are not desirous of turning over their influence to the Chinese Communists. Further, as co-chairman of the ICC they do have a responsibility to see that the accords are respected.

26. Mr. Arends queried the Soviet financial obligations to the UN. The Director indicated that, of course, they have the obligation but take the position that they do not agree with the UN operations in the Congo and insist that this was a matter which should have been handled in the Security Council and not the General Assembly.

27. Mr. Vinson inquired as to the Communist influence in the Harlem riots and the Director replied that this was not of official concern to the Agency but rather to the FBI.

28. As to the fighting in Laos, Mr. Cline briefed the Subcommittee generally in accord with the briefing paper.

#### MADDOX

29. Mr. Cline briefed on the attack on the MADDOX pointing out that this was a routine patrol in international waters engaged in ELINT activities. It was pointed out that the torpedo boat attack on the MADDOX on 2 August was apparently planned and ordered by land-based authorities in North Vietnam. At least one of the three torpedo boats was severely damaged and may have been sunk and the others were probably damaged. It was pointed out that the DRV authorities may have believed the MADDOX was involved in the harrassing raid conducted by South Vietnam craft against the North Vietnam coast on the night of 30 July. Mr. Cline pointed out that in fact the MADDOX was not so involved. It was pointed out that the MADDOX was 29 miles out from the coast at the time of the attack. There appeared to be a clear consensus of the members of the Subcommittee that the rules of engagement were too strict for U. S. forces in the area.

#### CYPRUS

30. Mr. Cline turned to Cyprus. He stated that this remains a dangerous and delicate situation and that while there are numerous proposals the situation seems to have reached an impasse. Mr. Cline discussed the various partition lines which have been discussed with the Turks. He stated that Makarios is not agreeable to any of these proposals and apparently is playing his own game in harrassing the UN on the island. It was indicated there are Communist elements which are influencing Makarios in his actions. He stated that the four-way talks continue which involve the Greeks, Turks, British, and U. S. In the meantime, the Turks continue their military exercise. Mr. Cline concluded that we should not be surprised if major conflict erupts.

31. Mr. Cline briefed very quickly on the Congo situation indicating it is beginning to fall apart. Using maps, he illustrated rebel control of territories and their move toward Stanleyville. He mentioned the evacuation from Stanleyville of the U. S. Consul and described the rebels as being various tribal groups who generally oppose any central authority. However, the rebels have been infiltrated by Communists from Brazzaville and Burundi under influence of the Communist Chinese. Mr. Cline pointed out that Tshombe is attempting to pull together some military forces and is now in the process of re-activating his Katanga gendarmes. Mr. Cline pointed out that in fact there is very little real fighting and that when the rebels move into an area the Congolese army simply moves out and refuses to fight.

32. The meeting adjourned at 11:00 a. m.

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